Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions

ACM International Conference Proceeding Series

Volumn , Issue , 1999, Pages 96-102

  Lehmann, Daniel ^a,b   O'Callaghan, Liaden Ita ^a   Shoham, Yoav ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CLASSICAL MECHANISM; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; GENERALIZED VICKREY AUCTION; GOLD STANDARDS; GREEDY OPTIMIZATION; OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS; PAYMENT SCHEMES; PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE;

ECONOMICS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

OPTIMIZATION;

EID: 0010248861     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/336992.337016     Document Type: Conference Paper

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