First-price path auctions

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 203-212

  Immorlica, Nicole ^a   Nikolova, Evdokia ^a   Karger, David ^a   Sami, Rahul ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

First price auctions; Path auctions

Indexed keywords

FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS; PATH AUCTIONS; PAYMENTS;

COST EFFECTIVENESS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; PARAMETER ESTIMATION; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

ECONOMICS;

EID: 30044445224     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1064009.1064031     Document Type: Conference Paper

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