Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 140-149

  Chen, Po An ^a   Kempe, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Altruism; Anarchy; Routing; Selfishness; Spite

Indexed keywords

A-COEFFICIENT; LATENCY FUNCTION; LINEAR COMBINATIONS; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; NETWORK TOPOLOGY; NONUNIFORM; PARALLEL LINK NETWORKS; PRICE OF ANARCHY; STACKELBERG; TRAFFIC ROUTING;

ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT; ELECTRIC NETWORK TOPOLOGY; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

COSTS;

EID: 77950908720     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1386790.1386816     Document Type: Conference Paper

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