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Volumn 2333 LNAI, Issue , 2002, Pages 335-347

Antisocial agents and Vickrey auctions

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INTELLIGENT AGENTS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; PROFITABILITY; COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS;

EID: 84901711735     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-45448-9_25     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (33)

References (20)
  • 1
    • 0003585504 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Antisocial bidding in repeated vickrey auctions
    • Institut für Informatik, Technische Universität München
    • F. Brandt. Antisocial Bidding in Repeated Vickrey Auctions. Technical Report FKI-241-00, Institut für Informatik, Technische Universität München, 2000.
    • (2000) Technical Report FKI-241-00
    • Brandt, F.1
  • 2
    • 84937394850 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Cryptographic protocols for secure second-price auctions
    • M. Klusch and F. Zambonelli, editors, volume 2182 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Berlin et al., Springer
    • F. Brandt. Cryptographic protocols for secure second-price auctions. In M. Klusch and F. Zambonelli, editors, Cooperative Information Agents V, volume 2182 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, pages 154-165, Berlin et al., 2001. Springer.
    • (2001) Cooperative Information Agents v , pp. 154-165
    • Brandt, F.1
  • 3
    • 23044517609 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Task assignment in multiagent systems based on Vickreytype auctioning and leveled commitment contracting
    • M. Klusch and L.Kerschberg, editors, volume 1860 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Berlin et al., Springer
    • F. Brandt,W. Brauer, and G.Weiß. Task assignment in multiagent systems based on Vickreytype auctioning and leveled commitment contracting. In M. Klusch and L.Kerschberg, editors, Cooperative Information Agents IV, volume 1860 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, pages 95-106, Berlin et al., 2000. Springer.
    • (2000) Cooperative Information Agents IV , pp. 95-106
    • Brandt, F.1    Brauer, W.2    Weiß, G.3
  • 4
    • 27944502019 scopus 로고
    • User control modes and IP allocation
    • K. Danielsen and M. Weiss. User control modes and IP allocation. http://www.press.umich.edu/jep/works/DanieContr.html, 1995. presented at MIT Workshop on Internet Economics.
    • (1995) MIT Workshop on Internet Economics
    • Danielsen, K.1    Weiss, M.2
  • 5
    • 0003305868 scopus 로고
    • Incentive engineering for computational resource management
    • B.A. Huberman, editor, The Netherlands
    • K.E. Drexler and M.S. Miller. Incentive engineering for computational resource management. In B.A. Huberman, editor, The Ecology of Computation. The Netherlands, 1988.
    • (1988) The Ecology of Computation
    • Drexler, K.E.1    Miller, M.S.2
  • 10
    • 0001757115 scopus 로고
    • Atheory of auctions and competitive bidding
    • P.R. Milgrom and R.J.Weber. ATheory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding. Econometrica, 50:1089-1122, 1982.
    • (1982) Econometrica , vol.50 , pp. 1089-1122
    • Milgrom, P.R.1    Weber, R.J.2
  • 12
    • 21844516729 scopus 로고
    • Two models of bid-taker cheating in Vickrey auctions
    • M.H. Rothkopf and R.M. Harstad. Two models of bid-taker cheating in Vickrey auctions. Journal of Business, 68(2):257-267, 1995.
    • (1995) Journal of Business , vol.68 , Issue.2 , pp. 257-267
    • Rothkopf, M.H.1    Harstad, R.M.2
  • 18
    • 84980096808 scopus 로고
    • Counter speculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders
    • W.Vickrey. Counter speculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16(1):8-37, 1961.
    • (1961) Journal of Finance , vol.16 , Issue.1 , pp. 8-37
    • Vickrey, W.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.