How much can taxes help selfish routing?

Journal of Computer and System Sciences

Volumn 72, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 444-467

  Cole, Richard ^a   Dodis, Yevgeniy ^a   Roughgarden, Tim ^b  

^a New York University ^*  (United States)

^b Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Game theory in networks; Inefficiency of equilibria; Marginal cost taxes; Pricing; Selfish routing

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION THEORY; COMPUTER NETWORKS; COSTS; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; GAME THEORY; NONLINEAR SYSTEMS; TAXATION;

GAME THEORY IN NETWORKS; INEFFICIENCY OF EQUILIBRIA; MARGINAL COST TAXES; PRICING; SELFISH ROUTING;

CONGESTION CONTROL (COMMUNICATION);

EID: 33645799677     PISSN: 00220000     EISSN: 10902724     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcss.2005.09.010     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. Altman E., Boulogne T., El Azouzi R., Jiménez T., and Wynter L. A survey on networking games in telecommunications. Comput. Oper. Res. 33 2 (2006) 286-311
2. A. Archer, É. Tardos, Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents, in: Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2001, pp. 482-491.
3. A. Archer, É. Tardos, Frugal path mechanisms, in: Proceedings of the 13th Annual Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2002, pp. 991-999 (full version to appear in Journal of Algorithms).
4. Arnott R., and Small K. The economics of traffic congestion. Amer. Sci. 82 5 (1994) 446-455
5. Beckmann M., McGuire C.B., and Winsten C.B. Studies in the Economics of Transportation (1956), Yale University Press
6. Bergendorff P., Hearn D.W., and Ramana M.V. Congestion toll pricing of traffic networks. In: Pardalos P.M., Hearn D.W., and Hager W.W. (Eds). Network Optimization (1997), Springer, Berlin 51-71
7. Braess D. Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung. Unternehmensforschung 12 (1968) 258-268
8. Cocchi R., Shenker S.J., Estrin D., and Zhang L. Pricing in computer networks: motivation, formulation, and example. IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking 1 6 (1993) 614-627
9. R. Cole, Y. Dodis, T. Roughgarden, Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users, in: Proceedings of the 35th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2003, pp. 521-530.
10. Correa J.R., Schulz A.S., and Stier Moses N.E. Selfish routing in capacitated networks. Math. Oper. Res. 29 4 (2004) 961-976
11. Dafermos S.C., and Nagurney A. Sensitivity analysis for the asymmetric network equilibrium problem. Math. Programming 28 2 (1984) 174-184
12. Dafermos S.C., and Sparrow F.T. The traffic assignment problem for a general network. J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards Ser. B 73B 2 (1969) 91-118
13. Dial R.B. Network-optimized road pricing: Part I: a parable and a model. Oper. Res. 47 1 (1999) 54-64
14. Dial R.B. Network-optimized road pricing: Part II: algorithms and examples. Oper. Res. 47 2 (1999) 327-336
15. E. Elkind, A. Sahai, K. Steiglitz, Frugality in path auctions, in: Proceedings of the 15th Annual Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2004, pp. 694-702.
16. Ferrari P. Road network toll pricing and social welfare. Transportation Res. Part B 36 5 (2002) 471-483
17. L.K. Fleischer, Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks, in: Proceedings of the 31st Annual International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3142, 2004, pp. 544-554.
18. L.K. Fleischer, K. Jain, M. Mahdian, Tolls for heterogeneous selfish users in multicommodity networks and generalized congestion games, in: Proceedings of the 45th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2004, pp. 277-285.
19. Fortune S., Hopcroft J.E., and Wyllie J. The directed subgraph homeomorphism problem. Theoret. Comput. Sci. 10 2 (1980) 111-121
20. Gibbens R.J., and Kelly F.P. Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control. Automatica 35 12 (1999) 1969-1985
21. Hall M.A. Properties of the equilibrium state in transportation networks. Transportation Sci. 12 3 (1978) 208-216
22. Hearn D.W., and Ramana M.V. Solving congestion toll pricing models. In: Marcotte P., and Nguyen S. (Eds). Equilibrium and Advanced Transportation Modeling (1998), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 109-124
23. Johansson B., and Mattsson L. Road Pricing: Theory, Empirical Assessment and Policy (1995), Kluwer, Dordrecht
24. G. Karakostas, S.G. Kolliopoulos, Edge pricing of multicommodity networks for heterogeneous selfish users, in: Proceedings of the 45th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2004, pp. 268-276.
25. A. Karlin, D. Kempe, T. Tamir, Beyond VCG: frugality of truthful mechanisms, in: Proceedings of the 46th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2005, pp. 615-624.
26. Kelly F.P., Maulloo A.K., and Tan D.K.H. Rate control for communication networks: shadow prices, proportional fairness and stability. J. Oper. Res. Soc. 49 3 (1998) 237-252
27. E. Koutsoupias, C.H. Papadimitriou, Worst-case equilibria, in: Proceedings of the 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1563, 1999, pp. 404-413.
28. H. Lin, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, A stronger bound on Braess's Paradox, in: Proceedings of the 15th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2004, pp. 333-334.
29. H. Lin, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, A. Walkover, Braess's Paradox, Fibonacci numbers, and exponential inapproximability, in: Proceedings of the 32nd Annual International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3580, 2005, pp. 497-512.
30. MacKie-Mason J.K., and Varian H.R. Pricing congestible network resources. IEEE J. Selected Areas Commun. 13 7 (1995) 1141-1149
31. McKnight L.W., and Bailey J.P. Internet Economics (1998), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
32. M. Mihail, C.H. Papadimitriou, A. Saberi, On certain connectivity properties of the Internet topology, in: Proceedings of the 44th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2003, pp. 28-35.
33. J.A. Mirrlees, The theory of optimal taxation, in: K.J. Arrow, M.D. Intriligator (Eds.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, vol. III, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1986, pp. 1197-1249 (Chapter 24).
34. Papadimitriou C.H. Algorithms, games, and the Internet. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC) (2001) 749-753
35. Pigou A.C. The Economics of Welfare (1920), Macmillan, New York
36. T. Roughgarden, Designing networks for selfish users is hard, in: Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2001, pp. 472-481 (full version to appear in Journal of Computer and System Sciences).
37. Roughgarden T. The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology. J. Comput. System Sci. 67 2 (2003) 341-364 (preliminary version in STOC '02)
38. Roughgarden T. Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy (2005), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
39. Roughgarden T., and Tardos E. How bad is selfish routing?. J. ACM 49 2 (2002) 236-259 (preliminary version in FOCS '00)
40. L. Schulman, Personal communication, October 1999.
41. Smith M.J. The marginal cost taxation of a transportation network. Transportation Res. Part B 13 3 (1979) 237-242
42. K. Talwar, The price of truth: frugality in truthful mechanisms, in: Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2607, 2003, pp. 608-619.
43. Tarjan R.E. Data Structures and Network Algorithms (1983), SIAM, Philadelphia, PA
44. J.G. Wardrop, Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research, in: Proceedings of the Institute of Civil Engineers, Pt. II, vol. 1, 1952, pp. 325-378.