Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism

EC'07 - Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 93-102

  Sharma, Yogeshwer ^a   Williamson, David P ^b  

^a Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

^b Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

Altruistic flow; Centrally controlled flow; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Price of anarchy; Stackelberg equilibrium; Stackelberg threshold

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISTIC FLOW; CENTRALLY CONTROLLED FLOW; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; PRICE OF ANARCHY; STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM; STACKELBERG THRESHOLD;

COSTS; LINEAR CONTROL SYSTEMS; NUMERICAL METHODS; OPTIMIZATION; PROBLEM SOLVING;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 36448981752     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1250910.1250925     Document Type: Conference Paper

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