Multimode control attacks on elections

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 128-133

  Faliszewski, Piotr ^a   Hemaspaandra, Edith ^b   Hemaspaandra, Lane A ^c  

^a AGH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Poland)

^b Rochester Institute of Technology   (United States)

^c University of Rochester   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

ELECTION SYSTEMS; HARDNESS RESULT; MULTIMODE CONTROL; MULTIMODES; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; UNIFIED FRAMEWORK;

POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

EID: 77949912648     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (16)

1. J. Bartholdi, III, C. Tovey, and M. Trick. The computational difficulty of manipulating an election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6(3):227-241, 1989.
2. J. Bartholdi, III, C. Tovey, and M. Trick. How hard is it to control an election? Mathematical and Computer Modeling, 16(8/9):27-40, 1992.
3. V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate. In Proceedings of AAAI-06, pages 627-634. AAAI Press, July 2006.
4. S. Dobzinski and A. Procaccia. Frequent manipulability of elections: The case of two voters. In Proceedings of WINE-08, pages 653-664. Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science #5385, December 2008.
5. G. Erdélyi, M. Nowak, and J. Rothe. Sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting broadly resists control. In Proceedings of MFCS-08, pages 311-322. Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science #5162, August 2008.
6. P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra. The complexity of bribery in elections. In Proceedings of AAAI-06, pages 641-646. AAAI Press, July 2006. Full version to appear in the Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research.
7. P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. Copeland voting fully resists constructive control. In Proceedings of AAIM-08, pages 165-176. Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science #5034, June 2008. Full version to appear in the Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research.
8. P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. A richer understanding of the complexity of election systems. In S. Ravi and S. Shukla, editors, Fundamental Problems in Computing: Essays in Honor of Professor Daniel J. Rosenkrantz. Springer, to appear.
9. E. Friedgut, G. Kalai, and N. Nisan. Elections can be manipulated often. In Proceedings of FOCS-08, pages 243-249. IEEE Computer Society, October 2008.
10. M. Garey and D. Johnson. Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness. W. H. Freeman and Company, 1979.
11. E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative. Artificial Intelligence, 171(5-6):255-285, 2007.
12. E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. Hybrid elections broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control. In Proceedings of IJCAI-07, pages 1308-1314. AAAI Press, January 2007.
13. R. Meir, A. Procaccia, J. Rosenschein, and A. Zohar. The complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 33:149-178, 2008.
14. L. Xia and V. Conitzer. Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability. In Proceedings of ACM EC-08, pages 109-118. ACM Press, July 2008.
15. L. Xia and V. Conitzer. A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable. In Proceedings of ACM EC-08, pages 99-108. ACM Press, July 2008.
16. M. Zuckerman, P. Faliszewski, Y. Bachrach, and E. Elkind. Manipulating quota value in weighted voting games. In Proceedings of AAAI-08, pages 215-220. AAAI Press, July 2008.