Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: Political budget cycles in the West German states

Public Choice

Volumn 142, Issue 1-2, 2010, Pages 125-150

  Schneider, Christina J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Deficit spending; German states; Political budget cycles; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949775795     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9480-5     Document Type: Article

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