Informational control and organizational design

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 145, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 721-751

  Ivanov, Maxim ^a  

^a MCMASTER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Communication; Information

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949492818     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.11.002     Document Type: Article

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