Mediation, arbitration and negotiation

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 144, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1397-1420

  Goltsman, Maria ^a   Hörner, Johannes ^b   Pavlov, Gregory ^a   Squintani, Francesco ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BRESCIA   (Italy)

^d UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Arbitration; Cheap talk; Communication; Information; Long cheap talk; Mechanism design; Mediation; Negotiation

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649304906     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.010     Document Type: Article

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