Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions

Econometrica

Volumn 78, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 1007-1030

  Ganuza, Juan José ^a   Penalva, José S ^b  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

Auctions; Competition; Information; Variability orderings

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954139477     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3982/ECTA6640     Document Type: Article

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