Information structures in optimal auctions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 137, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 580-609

  Bergemann, Dirk ^a   Pesendorfer, Martin ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Information; Optimal auction; Partitions; Private values

Indexed keywords

EID: 36048952783     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001     Document Type: Article

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