Naive audience and communication bias

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 129-150

  Ottaviani, Marco ^a   Squintani, Francesco ^b  

^a LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bounded support; Naive audience; Strategic information transmission

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846013525     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0054-1     Document Type: Article

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