Agency and anxiety

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 87-116

  Rauh, Michael T ^a   Seccia, Giulio ^b  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77749279614     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: 15309134     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00246.x     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. Akerlof GA, Kranton RE. Identity, Supervision, and Work Groups. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 2008, 98(2):212-217.
2. Anderson CR. Coping Behaviors as Intervening Mechanisms in the Inverted-U Stress-Performance Relationship. Journal of Applied Psychology 1976, 61(1):30-34.
3. Anderson KJ. Arousal and the Inverted-U Hypothesis: A Critique of Neiss's 'Reconceptualizing Arousal'. Psychological Bulletin 1990, 107(1):96-100.
4. Apesteguia J, Palacios-Huerta I. Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment. 2008, Mimeo
5. Ariely D, Gneezy U, Loewenstein G, Mazar N. Large Stakes and Big Mistakes. The Review of Economic Studies 2005, 76:451-469.
6. Baer M, Oldham GR. The Curvilinear Relation Between Experienced Creative Time Pressure and Creativity: Moderating Effects of Openness to Experience and Support for Creativity. Journal of Applied Psychology 2006, 91(4):963-970.
7. Barkema HG. Do Top Managers Work Harder When They Are Monitored. Kyklos 1995, 48:19-42.
8. Bénabou R, Tirole J. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation. Review of Economic Studies 2003, 70(3):489-520.
9. Bénabou R, Tirole J. Incentives and Prosocial Behavior. American Economic Review 2006, 96(5):1652-1678.
10. Bolton P, Dewatripont M. Contract Theory 2005, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press
11. Bose A, Pal D, Sappington DEM. On the Performance of Linear Contracts. 2008, Mimeo
12. Caplin A. Fear as a Policy Instrument. Time and Decision: Economic and Psychological Perspectives on Intertemporal Choice 2003, 441-458. Baumeister RLoewenstein GRead D. in, eds., New York, Russell Sage Foundation
13. Caplin AS, Leahy J. Psychological Expected Utility Theory and Anticipatory Feelings. Quarterly Journal of Economics 2001, 116(1):55-79.
14. Casadesus-Masanell R. Trust in Agency. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 2004, 13(3):375-404.
15. Dohmen TJ. Do Professionals Choke Under Pressure. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2008, 65(3-4):636-653.
16. Eysenck MW, Calvo MG. Anxiety and Performance: The Processing Efficiency Theory. Cognition and Emotion 1992, 6(6):409-434.
17. Falk A, Kosfeld M. The Hidden Costs of Control. American Economic Review 2006, 96(5):1611-1630.
18. Fehr E, Gächter S. Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2000, 14(3):159-181.
19. Fehr E, Klein A, Schmidt KM. Fairness and Contract Design. Econometrica 2007, 75(1):121-154.
20. Frey BS. Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort? The Rivalry with Trust and Loyalty. Economic Inquiry 1993, 31(4):663-670.
21. Frey BS, Jegen R. Motivation Crowding Theory. Journal of Economic Surveys 2001, 15(5):589-611.
22. Glaeser EL. Psychology and the Market. 2003, Discussion Paper 2023, Harvard Institute of Economic Research
23. Gneezy U. The 'W' Effect of Incentives. 2003, Working paper
24. Gneezy U, Rustichini A. Pay Enough or Don't Pay At All. Quarterly Journal of Economics 2000, 115(3):791-810.
25. Guo M, Ou-Yang H. Incentives and Performance in the Presence of Wealth Effects and Endogenous Risk. Journal of Economic Theory 2006, 129(1):150-191.
26. Holmström B. Moral Hazard and Observability. Bell Journal of Economics 1979, 10(1):74-91.
27. Holmström B, Milgrom P. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1991, 7:24-52.
28. Hurtz GM, Donovan JJ. Personality and Job Performance: The Big Five Revisited. Journal of Applied Psychology 2000, 85(6):869-879.
29. Jordet G, Hartman E, Visscher C, Lemmink KAPM. Kicks from the Penalty Mark in Soccer: The Roles of Stress, Skill, and Fatigue for Kick Outcomes. Journal of Sports Sciences 2007, 25(2):121-129.
30. Judge TA, Ilies R. Relationship of Personality to Performance Motivation: A Meta-Analytic Review. Journal of Applied Psychology 2002, 87(4):797-807.
31. Lazear EP. Performance Pay and Productivity. American Economic Review 2000, 90(5):1346-1361.
32. Loewenstein G. Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption. Economic Journal 1987, 97(387):666-684.
33. MacLeod A, Williams J, Bekerian D. Worry is Reasonable: The Role of Explanations in Pessimism about Future Personal Events. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 1991, 100(4):478-486.
34. Milgrom P, Roberts J. Economics, Organization, and Management 1992, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall
35. Mirrlees JA. The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I. Review of Economic Studies 1999, 66(1):3-21.
36. Muse LA, Harris SG, Feild HS. Has the Inverted-U Theory of Stress and Job Performance Had a Fair Test. Human Performance 2003, 16(4):349-364.
37. Neiss R. Re-Conceptualizing Arousal: Psychobiological States in Motor Performance. Psychological Bulletin 1988, 103(3):345-366.
38. Oyer P. Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects. Journal of Finance 2004, 59(4):1619-1649.
39. Oyer P, Schaefer S. Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories. Journal of Financial Economics 2005, 76:99-133.
40. Palacios-Huerta I. Professionals Play Minimax. Review of Economic Studies 2003, 70(2):395-415.
41. Palacios-Huerta I, Volij O. Field Centipedes. American Economic Review 2009, 99(4):1619-1635.
42. Palacios-Huerta I, Volij O. Experientia Docet: Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments. Econometrica 2008, 76(1):71-115.
43. Prendergast C. The Provision of Incentives in Firms. Journal of Economic Literature 1999, 37:7-63.
44. Prendergast C. The Tenuous Trade-Off between Risk and Incentives. Journal of Political Economy 2002a, 110(5):1071-1102.
45. Prendergast C. Uncertainty and Incentives. Journal of Labor Economics 2002b, 20(2):115-137.
46. Ramalingam A, Rauh MT. Firms, Markets, and the Work Ethic. 2008, Working papers 2008-04, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Bloomington, IN
47. Rauh MT, Seccia G. Incentives, Monitoring, and Motivation. 2005, EconWPA Game Theory and Information Working Paper 0506008
48. Rauh MT, Seccia G. Anxiety and Performance: An Endogenous Learning-by-Doing Model. International Economic Review 2006, 47(2):583-609.
49. Rosen RH. Just Enough Anxiety: The Hidden Driver of Business Success 2008, New York, NY, Penguin Group, Inc
50. Rotemberg J. Human Relations in the Workplace. Journal of Political Economy 1994, 102(4):684-717.
51. Singh J. Striking a Balance in Boundary-Spanning Positions: An Investigation of Some Unconventional Influences of Role Stressors and Job Characteristics on Job Outcomes of Salespeople. Journal of Marketing 1998, 62(3):69-86.
52. Stiglitz JE. Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping. Review of Economic Studies 1974, 41(2):219-255.
53. Vives X. Oligopoly Pricing 1999, London, The MIT Press
54. Woodman T, Hardy L. Stress and Anxiety. Handbook of Sport Psychology 2001, 290-318. Singer RN, Hausenblas HAJanelle CM. in, eds., 2nd edition, New York, John Wiley and Sons
55. Zaichkowsky LD, Baltzell A. Arousal and Performance. Handbook of Sport Psychology 2001, 319-339. Singer RN, Hausenblas HAJanelle CM. in, eds., 2nd edition, New York, Wiley
56. Zivnuska S, Kiewitz C, Hochwarter WA, Perrewé PL, Zellars KL. What is Too Much or Too Little? The Curvilinear Effects of Job Tension on Turnover Intent, Value Attainment, and Job Satisfaction. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2002, 32(7):1344-1360.