Blaming the messenger: Notes on the current state of experimental economics

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 73, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 109-119

  Eckel, Catherine ^a   Gintis, Herbert ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^b CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY   (Hungary)

Author keywords

Experimental economics; Inequality aversion; Neoclassical theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 72949121090     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.026     Document Type: Article

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