Expectations and fairness in a simple bargaining experiment

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 303-327

  Harrison, Glenn W ^a   McCabe, Kevin A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030304509     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF02425260     Document Type: Article

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