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Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2007, Pages

A trace of anger is enough: On the enforcement of social norms

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 34548217396     PISSN: None     EISSN: 15452921     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (5)

References (15)
  • 1
    • 0000362594 scopus 로고
    • Impure Altruism and Donation to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Clow Giving?
    • Andreoni J., 1990, Impure Altruism and Donation to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Clow Giving?, The Economic Journal 100, 464-477.
    • (1990) The Economic Journal , vol.100 , pp. 464-477
    • Andreoni, J.1
  • 2
    • 0036220942 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
    • Andreoni J. and J.H. Miller, 2002, Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism, Econometrica 70, 737-753.
    • (2002) Econometrica , vol.70 , pp. 737-753
    • Andreoni, J.1    Miller, J.H.2
  • 4
    • 43249119447 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A Little Behavioralism Can Go a Long Way, mimeo based on chapter 8 in K. Binmore
    • MIT Press, Boston
    • Binmore K. and J. Swierzbinski, 2006, A Little Behavioralism Can Go a Long Way, mimeo based on chapter 8 in K. Binmore., Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge, MIT Press, Boston, 2006.
    • (2006) Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge
    • Binmore, K.1    Swierzbinski, J.2
  • 5
    • 0000885425 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
    • Bolton G. and A. Ockenfels, 2000, ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition, American Economic Review 90, 166-193.
    • (2000) American Economic Review , vol.90 , pp. 166-193
    • Bolton, G.1    Ockenfels, A.2
  • 6
    • 50249147784 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods
    • forthcoming
    • Carpenter J., 2004, Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods, Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
    • (2004) Games and Economic Behavior
    • Carpenter, J.1
  • 7
    • 0001791430 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Basins of Attraction, Long Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
    • Ellison G., 2000, Basins of Attraction, Long Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution, Review of Economic Studies 67, 17-45.
    • (2000) Review of Economic Studies , vol.67 , pp. 17-45
    • Ellison, G.1
  • 8
    • 0041152046 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiment
    • Fehr E. and S. Gächter, 2000a, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiment, American Economic Review 90, 980-994.
    • (2000) American Economic Review , vol.90 , pp. 980-994
    • Fehr, E.1    Gächter, S.2
  • 9
    • 0011574501 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity
    • Fehr E. and S. Gächter, 2000b, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, 159-181.
    • (2000) Journal of Economic Perspectives , vol.14 , pp. 159-181
    • Fehr, E.1    Gächter, S.2
  • 10
    • 0037049973 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Altruistic Punishment in Humans
    • Fehr E. and S. Gáchter, 2002, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, Nature 415, 137-140.
    • (2002) Nature , vol.415 , pp. 137-140
    • Fehr, E.1    Gáchter, S.2
  • 12
    • 0001090144 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments
    • Levine D.K., 1998, Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments, Review of Economic Dynamics 1, 593-622.
    • (1998) Review of Economic Dynamics , vol.1 , pp. 593-622
    • Levine, D.K.1
  • 15


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.