Corporate strategy and information disclosure

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 164-184

  Ferreira, Daniel ^a   Rezende, Marcelo ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 36549025398     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00050.x     Document Type: Article

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