Governmental behavior in representative democracy: Asynthesis of the theoretical literature

Public Choice

Volumn 141, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 447-465

  Le Maux, Benoît ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE RENNES 1   (France)

Author keywords

Bureaucracy; Central and local government; Flypaper effect; Lobbying; Median voter; Partisan politicians; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350582712     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9463-6     Document Type: Article

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