Economic policy and special interest politics

Economic Journal

Volumn 108, Issue 447, 1998, Pages 310-327

  Persson, Torsten ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037741776     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00289     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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