Jurisdiction size, political participation, and the allocation of resources

Public Choice

Volumn 113, Issue 3-4, 2002, Pages 251-263

  Borck, Rainald ^a  

^a DIW BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036033256     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1020842219315     Document Type: Article

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