Leviathan and fiscal illusion in local government overlapping jurisdictions

Public Choice

Volumn 120, Issue 3-4, 2004, Pages 301-329

  Campbell, Rebecca J ^a  

^a MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 5444257393     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:PUCH.0000044290.95428.29     Document Type: Review

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