Has Leviathan been bound? A theory of imperfectly constrained government with evidence from the states

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 67, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 825-847

  Caplan, Bryan ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035637153     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1061573     Document Type: Article

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