Corruption, federalism, and policy formation in the OECD: The case of energy policy

Public Choice

Volumn 140, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 205-221

  Fredriksson, Per G ^a   Vollebergh, Herman R J ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE   (United States)

^b ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^c PBL NETHERLANDS ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AGENCY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Corruption; Energy efficiency; Federalism; Institutions; Political economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349904765     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9419-x     Document Type: Article

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