Economic analysis of corruption: A survey

Economic Journal

Volumn 113, Issue 491, 2003, Pages

  Aidt, Toke S ^a  

^a JESUS COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ANALYTICAL METHOD; CORRUPTION; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS;

EID: 0345550402     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1046/j.0013-0133.2003.00171.x     Document Type: Article

References (88)

1. Abed, G. T. and Gupta, S., eds., (2002). Governance, Corruption and Economic Performance, Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
2. Acemoglu, D. (1995). 'Reward structures and the allocation of talent', European Economic Review, vol. 39, pp. 17-33.
3. Acemoglu, D. and Verdier, T. (1998). 'Property rights, corruption and the allocation of talent: a general equilibrium approach', ECONOMIC JOURNAL, vol. 108, pp. 1381-403.
4. Acemoglu, D. and Verdier, T. (2000). 'The choice between market failure and corruption', American Economic Review, vol. 90(1), pp. 194-211.
5. Ades, A. and di Telia, R. (1997). 'National champions and corruption: some unpleasant interventionist arithmetic', ECONOMIC JOURNAL, vol. 107, pp. 1023-42.
6. Ades, A. and di Telia, R. (1999). 'Rents, competition and corruption', American Economic. Review, vol. 89, pp. 982-93.
7. Aidt, T. S. and Dutta, J. (2001). 'Policy compromises: corruption and regulation in a dynamic democracy', working paper, University of Cambridge.
8. Alam, M. S. (1989). 'Anatomy of corruption: an approach to the political reconomy of underdevelopment', American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 48, pp. 441-56. Reprinted in Williams et al. (2000) vol. 1 chapter 12.
9. Andvig, J. C. (1991). 'The economics of corruption: a survey', Studi Economici, vol. 43, pp. 57-94.
10. Andvig, J. C. and Moene, K.O. (1990). 'How corruption may corrupt?', Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, vol. 13(1), pp. 63-76.
11. Bliss, C., and di Telia, R. (1997). 'Does competition kill corruption?', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 105, pp. 1001-23.
12. Banerjee, A. (1997). 'A theory of misgovernance', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112, pp. 1289-332.
13. Bardhan, P. (1997). 'Corruption and development: a review of issues', Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 35, pp. 1320-346.
14. Bardhan, P. and Mookherjee, D. (2000). 'Capture and governance at local and national levels', American Economic Review, vol. 90(2), pp. 135-9.
15. Beck, P. and Maher, M. W. (1986). 'A comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets', Economic Letters, vol. 20, pp. 1-5.
16. Becker, G. and Stigler, G. (1974). 'Law enforcement, malfeasance and the compensation of enforcers', Journal of legal Studies, vol. 3, pp. 1-19.
17. Besley, T. and McLaren, J. (1993). 'Taxes and bribery: the role of wage incentives', ECONOMIC JOURNAL, vol. 103, pp. 119-41.
18. Boyko, M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1996). 'A theory of privatization', ECONOMIC JOURNAL, vol. 106, pp. 309-19. Reprinted in Shleifer Land Vishny (1998) chapter 8.
19. Buchanan, J. M. and Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
20. Cadot O. (1987). 'Corruption as a gamble', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 33, pp. 223-44.
21. De Mello, L. and Barenstein, M. (2002). 'Fiscal decentralization and governance: a cross-country analysis', in (G.T. Abed and S. Gupta, eds.), Governance, Corruption and Economic Performance, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
22. De Soto, H. (1990). The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World, New York: Harper.
23. Dye, K. M. and Stapenhurst, R. (1998). 'Pillars of integrity: the importance of supreme audit institutions in curbing corruption', EDI/World Bank Institute Working Paper. Reprinted in Williams et al. (2000) vol. 4, chapter 16.
24. Dhami, S. (2003). 'Corruption and the provision of public output in a hierarchical asymmetric information relationship', Working paper, Department of Economics, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne.
25. Farrell, J. (1987). 'Information and the Coase Theorem', Journal of Economic Perspective, vol. 1(2), pp. 133-29.
26. Ferejohn, J. (1986). 'Incumbent performance and electoral control', Public Choice, vol. 50 (1-3), pp. 5-25.
27. Ghura, L. (2002). 'Tax revenues in Sub-Saharan Africa: effects of economic policies and corruption', in (G. T. Abed and S. Gupta, eds.), Governance, Corruption and Economic Performance, Washington DC: International Monetary, Fund (IMF).
28. Goulder, L. H., Parry, I. W. H. and Burtraw, D. (1997). 'Revenue-raising vs. other approaches to environmental protection: the critical significance of pre-existing tax distortions', Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 28(4), pp. 708-31.
29. Gupta, S., de Mello L. and Sharan, R. (2001), 'Corruption and military spending', European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 17, pp. 749-77.
30. Haque, N. U. and Sahay, R. (1996). 'Do government wage cuts close budget deficits? Costs of corruption', IMF Staff Papers, vol. 43(4), pp. 754-78.
31. Hillman, A. and Katz, E. (1987). 'Hierarchical structures and the social costs of bribes and transfers', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 34, pp. 129-42.
32. Hindriks, J., Keen, M. and Muthoo, A. (1999). 'Corruption, extortion and evasion', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 74, pp. 395-430. Reprinted in Abed and Gupta (2002) chapter 9.
33. Hutchcroft, P. D. (1991). 'Oligarchs and cronies in the Philippine state, the politics of patrimonial plunder', World Politics, vol. 43, pp. 414-50. Reprinted in Williams et al. (2000) vol. 2, chapter 15.
34. Jain A. K. (1998). 'Models of corruption', in (A. K. Jain, ed.), Economics of Corruption. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol. 65. Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic.
35. Jain A. K. (2001). 'Corruption: a review', Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 15(1), pp. 71-121.
36. Kaufmann, D. and Wei, S.J. (1999). 'Does "grease money" speed up the wheels of commerce?', National Bureau of Economic Research working paper no. 7093.
37. Klitgaard, R. (1997). 'Cleaning up and invigorating civil service', Public Administration and Development, vol. 17, pp. 487-509. Reprinted in Williams et al. (2000) vol. 4 chapter 14.
38. Kofrnan, F. and Lawarree, J. (1996). 'On the optimality of allowing collusion', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 61, pp. 383-407.
39. Laffont, J. J. and Tirole, J. (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
40. Laffont, J.J. and Martimort, D. (1997). 'Collusion under asymmetric information', Econometrica, vol. 65, pp. 875-911.
41. Laffont, J.J. and Guessan, T. N. (1999). 'Competition and corruption in an agency relationship', Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 60, pp. 271-95.
42. Laffont, J. J. (2000). Incentives and Political Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
43. Leff, N. (1964). 'Economic development through bureaucratic corruption', American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 8(3), pp. 8-14. Reprinted in Williams et al. (2000) vol. 1 chapter 2.
44. Leite, C. and Weidmann, J. (2002). 'Does mother nature corrupt? Natural resources, corruption, and economic growth', in (G. T. Abed and S. Gupta, eds.), Governance, Corruption and Economic Performance, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
45. Lui, F. T. (1985). 'An equilibrium queuing model of bribery', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 93, pp. 760-81.
46. Lui, F. T. (1986). 'A dynamic model of corruption deterrence', Journal of public Economics, vol. 31, pp. 215-36.
47. Mauro, P. (1995). 'Corruption and growth', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 110, pp. 681-712. Reprinted in Williams et al. (2000) vol. 1, chapter 14.
48. Mauro, P. (1998). 'Corruption and composition of government expenditure', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 69, pp. 263-279. Reprinted in Abed and Gupta (2002) chapter 9.
49. Mookherjee, B. and Png, I. P. L. (1992). 'Monitoring vis-a-vis investigation in enforcement of law', American Economic Review, vol. 82(3), pp. 556-65.
50. Mookherjee, B. and Png, I. P. L. (1995). 'Corruptible law enforcers: how should they be compensated?', ECONOMIC JOURNAL, vol. 105, pp. 145-59.
51. Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1991). 'The allocation of talent: implications for growth', Quarterly, Journal of Economics, vol. 106, pp. 503-30. Reprinted in Shleifer and Vishny (1998) chapter 3.
52. Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1993). 'Why is rent seeking so costly to growth?', American Economic Review Paper and Proceedings, vol. 83, pp. 409-14. Reprinted in Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) chapter 4.
53. Myerson, R. B. (1993). 'Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption: a game-theoretic analysis', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 5, pp. 118-32.
54. Nitzan, S. (1994). 'Modeling rent-seeking contests', European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 10, pp. 41-60.
55. Paldam, M. (2002). 'The cross-country pattern of corruption: Economics, culture and the seesaw dynamics', European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 18(2), pp. 215-20.
56. Persson, T., Roland, G. and Tabellini, G. (1997). 'Separation of powers and political accountability', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112, pp. 1163-202.
57. Persson, T., Roland, G. and Tabellini, G. (2000). 'Comparative politics and public finance', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 108, pp. 1121-41.
58. Philp, M. (1997). 'Defining political corruption', Political Studies, vol. 45 (3), Special Issue, pp. 436-62. Reprinted in Williams et al (2000) vol. 1, chapter 22.
59. Posner, R. A. (1986). Economic. Analysis of Law, 3rd edition, Boston: Little, Brown.
60. Rasmusen, E. and Ramseyer, M.J. (1994). 'Cheap bribes and the corruption ban: a coordination game among rational legislators', Public Choice, vol. 78, pp. 305-27.
61. Rijckeghem, C. van and Weder, B. S. (2001). 'Corruption and the rate of temptation: do low wages in the civil service cause corruption?', Journal of Development Economics, vol. 65, pp. 291-307. Reprinted in Abed and Gupta (2002) chapter 3.
62. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1975). 'The economics of corruption', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 4, pp. 187-203.
63. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978). Corruption: A Study in Political Economy, New York: Academic Press.
64. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and Government, Causes, Consequences and Reform, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
65. Sah, R. K. (1988). 'Persistence and pervasiveness of corruption: new perspectives', Yale Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper 560.
66. Saha, B. (2001). 'Red tape, incentive bribe and the provision of subsidy', Journal of Development Economics, vol. 65, pp. 113-33.
67. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1992). 'Pervasive shortages under socialism', RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 23 (3), pp. 237-46. Reprinted in Shleirer and Vishny (1998) chapter 6.
68. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1993). 'Corruption', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 108, pp. 599-618. Reprinted in Williams et al. (2000) vol. 1, chapter 13 and in Shleifer and Vishny. (1998) chapter 5.
69. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1994a). 'Politicians and firms', Quarterly Journal of Ecomics, vol. 109, pp. 995-1026. Reprinted in Shleifer and Vishny (1998) chapter 9.
70. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1994b). 'The politics of market socialism', Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 8(2), pp. 165-76. Reprinted in Shleifer and Vishny (1998) chapter 7.
71. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1998). The Grabbing Hand, Government Pathologies and Their Cures, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
72. Skidmore, M. J. (1996). 'Promise and peril in combating corruption: Hong Kong's ICAC', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 547, pp. 118-30.
73. Tanzi, V. (1998). 'Corruption around the world, causes, consequences, scope, and cures', IMF Staff Papers, vol. 45(4), pp. 559-94. Reprinted in Abed and Gupta (2002) chapter 2.
74. Tirole, J. (1986). 'Hierarchies and bureaucracies: on the role of collusion in organisation', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 2, pp. 181-214.
75. Tirole, J. (1992). 'Collusion and the theory of organization', in (J.J. Laffont, ed.), Advances in Economic Theory, Sixth World Congress Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
76. Tirole, J. (1994). 'The internal organisation of government', Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 46, pp. 1-29.
77. Tirole, J. (1996). 'A theory of collective reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)', Review of Economic Studies, vol. 63, pp. 1-22.
78. Tollison, R. D. (1997). 'Rent seeking', in (B. C. Mueller, ed.), Perspectives on Public Choice, A Handbook, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
79. Toye, J. and Moore, M. (1998). 'Taxation, corruption and reform', European Journal of Development Research, vol. 10(1), pp. 60-84. Reprinted in Williams et al. (2000) vol. 4, chapter 19.
80. Treisman, D. (2000). 'The causes of corruption: a cross-national study', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 76, pp. 399-457.
81. Varese, F. (1997). The transition to the market and corruption in Post-socialist Russia', Political Studies, vol. 45, pp. 579-96.
82. Wade, R. (1985). 'The market for public office: why the Indian State is not better at development', World Development, vol. 13(4), pp. 467-97. Reprinted in Williams et al. (2000) vol. 2 chapter 17.
83. Wei, S.J. (2000). 'How taxing is corruption on international investors?', Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 82(1), pp. 1-11.
84. Williams, R. (1976). 'The problem of corruption, a conceptual and comparative analysis', PAC Bulletin, vol. 22, pp. 41-53. Reprinted in Williams et al. (2000) vol. 1, chapter 8.
85. Williams, R. ed., (2000). 'The Politics of Corruption vol. 1, Explaining Corruption, Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar.
86. Williams, R. and Theobald, R., eds., (2000). The Politics of Corruption vol. 2, Corruption in the Developing World, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
87. Williams, R., Moran, J. and Flanary, R., eds., (2000). The Politics of Corruption vol. 3, Corruption in the Developed World, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
88. Williams, R. and Doig, A., eds., (2000). The Politics of Corruption vol. 4, Controlling Corruption, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.