Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 403-442

  Potters, Jan ^a   Sloof, Randolph ^b  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Empirical models; Interest groups

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030295704     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(96)00008-0     Document Type: Article

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