How elections matter: Theory and evidence from environmental policy

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 121, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 1249-1281

  List, John A ^a   Sturm, Daniel M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646164308     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/qjec.121.4.1249     Document Type: Article

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