Trade policy: What′s welfare got to do with it?

Economics Letters

Volumn 96, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 64-69

  Damania, Richard ^a,b   Fredriksson, Per G ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE   (Australia)

^b WORLD BANK   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE   (United States)

Author keywords

Instability; Institutions; Lobbying; Trade policy; Veto players

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249728416     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.011     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Cadot, O., Grether, J-M., Olarreaga, M., 2003. India's trade policy for sale: how much? Who buys? mimeo, HEC Lausanne.
2. Gawande K., and Bandyopadhyay U. Is protection for sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman theory of endogenous protection. Review of Economics and Statistics 82 (2000) 139-152
3. Goldberg P.K., and Maggi G. Protection for sale: an empirical investigation. American Economic Review 89 (1999) 1135-1155
4. Grossman G., and Helpman E. Protection for sale. American Economic Review 84 (1994) 833-850
5. Mitra D., Thomakos D.D., and Ulubaşoǧlu M.A. Protection for sale in a developing country: democracy vs. dictatorship. Review of Economics and Statistics 84 (2002) 497-508
6. Prat A., and Rustichini A. Games played through agents. Econometrica 71 (2003) 989-1026
7. Tsebelis G. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (2002), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA