Reexamining the managerial ownership effect on firm value

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 15, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 573-586

  Benson, Bradley W ^a   Davidson III, Wallace N ^b  

^a LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Executive compensation; Firm value; Managerial ownership

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349859989     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.08.002     Document Type: Article

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