The impact of firm size on pay-performance sensitivities

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 609-627

  Cichello, Michael S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Firm size; Incentives; Managerial ownership

Indexed keywords

EID: 23844554891     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2004.09.001     Document Type: Article

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