Keeping capital flowing: The role of the IMF

International Finance

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 421-450

  Bordo, Michael D ^a   Mody, Ashoka ^b   Oomes, Nienke ^b  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL FLOW; IMF; MARKET CONDITIONS;

EID: 13244279717     PISSN: 13670271     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1367-0271.2004.00144.x     Document Type: Article

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