IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: Theory and empirics

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 84, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 640-666

  Marchesi, Silvia ^a,b   Sabani, Laura ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MILANO BICOCCA   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF FLORENCE   (Italy)

Author keywords

Conditionality; Dynamic panel; IMF programmes; Incomplete information; Reputation

Indexed keywords

CONDITIONALITY; IMF; LENDING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 34548086997     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.01.001     Document Type: Article

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