Are economic forecasts of the International Monetary Fund politically biased? A public choice analysis

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 2, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 239-260

  Aldenhoff, Frank Oliver ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Economic forecasts; IMF; Political business cycles

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548220119     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-006-9010-x     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. Artis, M. J. (1988). How accurate is the World Economic Outlook? (pp. 1-49). Staff Studies for the World Economic Outlook, Washington D.C., July.
2. Artis, M. J. (1996). How accurate are the IMF's short-term forecasts/another examination of the World Economic Outlook. IMF Working Paper no. 89, August.
3. Barrionuevo, J. M. (1993). How accurate are the World Economic Outlook projections? (pp. 28-46). Staff Studies for the World Economic Outlook. Washington D.C., December.
4. Batchelor, R. (2000). The IMF and OECD versus Consensus Forecasts. London: City University Business School, August.
5. Beach, W. W., Schavey, A. B., & Isidro, I. M. (1999). How reliable are IMF economic forecasts? Working Paper CDA99-05. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, August.
6. Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., & Walsh, P. (2001). New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions. World Bank Economic Review, 15(1), 165-176.
7. Diebold, F. X. (2001). Elements of forecasting (2nd ed.). South Western, Cincinnati.
8. Diebold, F. X., & Mariano, R. S. (1995). Comparing predictive accuracy. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 13(3), 253-263.
9. Döpke, J., & Fritsche, U. (2004). Growth and inflation forecasts for Germany-an assessment of accuracy and dispersion. Discussion Paper of the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) no. 399.
10. Dreher, A., & Vaubel, R. (2004). Do IMF and IBRD cause moral hazard and political business cycles? Evidence from panel data. Open Economies Review, 15(1), 5-22.
11. Fratianni, M., & Pattison, J. (1976). The economics of the OECD. In K. Brunner & A. Meltzer (Eds.), Institutions, policies and economic performance, Carnegie-Rochester conference series on public policy (pp. 75-128). Amsterdam.
12. Fratianni, M., & Pattison, J. (1982). The economics of international organizations. Kyklos, 35(2), 244-262.
13. Fratianni, M., & Pattison, J. (1991). International institutions and the market for information. In R. Vaubel & T. D. Willett (Eds.), The political economy of international organizations: A public-choice approach (pp. 204-244). Boulder: Westview.
14. Frey, B. (1984). The public-choice view of international political economy. International Organization, 38(1), 199-223.
15. Gerster, R. (1993). Accountability of the executive directors in Bretton Woods Institutions. Journal of World Trade, 27(1), 88-116.
16. Gorvin, I. (1989). Elections since 1945: A worldwide reference compendium. Essex: Longman.
17. Grömling, M. (2005). Konjunkturprognosen-Verfahren, Erfolgskontrolle und Prognosefehler. IW-Diskussionsbeitrag Nr. 123, Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Köln.
18. Holden, K., & Peel, D. A. (1990). On testing for unbiasedness and efficiency of forecasts. Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, 58, 120-127, June.
19. Kenen, P. B., & Schwartz, S. B. (1986). The assessment of macroeconomic forecasts in the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook. Working Papers in International Economics, no. G-86-40, Princeton University.
20. Loungani, P. (2000). How accurate are private sector forecasts? Cross-country evidence from consensus forecasts of output growth. IMF Working Paper 00/77, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
21. Mincer, J., & Zarnowitz, V. (1969). The evaluation of economic forecasts. In J. Mincer (Ed.), Economic forecasts and expectations: Analyses of forecasting behavior and performance, NBER Studies in Business Cycles, 19, 3-46. New York.
22. Newey, W. K., & West, K. D. (1987). A simple positive semi-definite, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix. Econometrica, 55(3), 703-708.
23. Pons, J. (2000). The accuracy of IMF and OECD Forecasts for G7 countries. Journal of Forecasting, 19(1), 53-63.
24. Vaubel, R. (1990). Die Politische Ökonomie des Internationalen Währungsfonds: Eine Public-Choice-Analyse. Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie, 9, 258-281.
25. Vaubel, R. (1991). The political economy of the International Monetary Fund: A public-choice approach. In R. Vaubel & T. D. Willett (Eds.), The political economy of international organizations: A public-choice approach (pp. 204-244). Boulder: Westview.
26. Vaubel, R. (1996). Bureaucracy at the IMF and the World Bank: A comparison of the evidence. World Economy, 19(2), 195-210.
27. Vaubel, R. (2006). Principal-agent problems in international organizations. The Review of International Organizations, 1(2), 125-138.
28. Wallis, K. F. (1989). Macroeconomic forecasting: A survey. Economic Journal, 99, 28-61 (March).
29. White, H. (1980). A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroscedasticity. Econometrica, 48(4), 817-838.