Strengthening the citizens' role in international organizations

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 27-43

  Frey, Bruno S ^a,b   Stutzer, Alois ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b CREMA CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Citizens; Democracy; Initiative; International organizations; Random selection; Recall; Referendum

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746177373     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-006-6605-1     Document Type: Article

References (71)

1. Archibugi, D., Balduini, S., & Donati, M. (2000). The United Nations as an agency of global democracy. In B. Holden (Ed.), Global democracy. London: Routledge.
2. Barber, B. R. (1984). Strong democracy: Participatory politics for a new age. Berkeley: University of California Press.
3. Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The politics, power and pathologies of international organizations. International Organization, 53, 699-732.
4. Benz, M., & Stutzer, A. (2004). Are voters better informed when they have a larger say in politics? Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland. Public Choice, 119(1-2), 31-59.
5. Bohnet, I., & Frey, B. S. (1.999). The sound of silence in prisoner's dilemma and dictator games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 38(1), 43-57.
6. Bowler, S., & Donovan, T. (1998). Demanding choices: Opinion, voting, and direct democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
7. Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1980). The power to tax: Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8. Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1985). The reason of rules. Constitutional political economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9. Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent. Logical foundations of constitutional democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
10. Butler, D., & Ranney, A. (Eds.). (1994). Referendums around the world. The growing use of direct democracy. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press.
11. Carson, L., & Martin, B. (1999). Random selection in politics. Westpoint, Conn, and London: Praeger.
12. Cooter, R. D. (2000). The strategic constitution. Princeton; Princeton University Press.
13. Cronin, T. E. (1989). Direct democracy. The politics of initiative, referendum and recall. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
14. Elster, J. (1989). Solomonic judgements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15. Engelstad, F. (1989). The assignment of political office by lot. Social Science Information, 25(1), 23-50.
16. Erez, E. (1985). Random assignment, the least fair of them all: Prisoners' attitudes toward various criteria of selection. Criminology, 23(2), 365-379.
17. Freedom House (1999). Freedom in the world: 1999-2000. The annual survey of political rights and civil liberties. New York, N.Y.: Freedom House.
18. Frey, B. S. (1969). Wahrscheinlichkeit als gesellschaftliche Entscheidungsregel. Wirtschaft und Recht, 21, 14-26.
19. Frey, B. S. (1978). Modern political economics. London: Martin Robinson.
20. Frey, B. S. (1983). Democratic economic policy. Oxford: Blackwell.
21. Frey, B. S. (1984). International political economics. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell.
22. Frey, B. S. (1994). Direct democracy: Politico-economic lessons from Swiss experience. American Economic Review, 84(2), 338-348.
23. Frey, B. S. (1997a). A constitution for knaves crowds out civic virtues. Economic Journal, 107(443), 1043-1053.
24. Frey, B. S. (1997b). Not just for the money. An economic theory of personal motivation. Cheltenham, UK and Brookfleld, USA: Edward Elgar.
25. Frey, B. S. (Ed.). (1997e). Political business cycles. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
26. Frey, B. S. (1997d). The public choice of international organizations. In D. C. Mueller (Ed.). Perspectives on public choice: A handbook (pp. 106-123). Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
27. Frey, B. S., & Gygi, B. (1990). The political economy of international organizations. Aussenwirt-schaft, 45(3), 371-394.
28. Frey, B. S., & Gygi, B. (1991). International organizations from the constitutional point of view. In R. Vaubel & T. D. Willett (Eds.). The political economy of international organizations: A public choice approach (pp. 58-78). Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press.
29. Frey, B. S., & Osterloh, M. (2005). Yes, managers should be paid like bureaucrats. Journal of Management Inquiry, 14(1), 96-111.
30. Frey, B. S., & Pommerehne, W. W. (1993). On the fairness of pricing-an empirical survey among the general population. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 20(3), 295-307.
31. Frey, B. S., & Stutzer, A. (2000). Happiness, economy and institutions. Economic Journal, 110(446), 918-938.
32. Frey, B. S., & Stutzer, A. (2006). Direct democracy: Designing a living constitution. In R. Congleton & B. Swedenborg (Eds.), Democratic constitutional design and public policy, analysis and evidence. Cambridge: MIT Press, forthcoming.
33. Frey, B. S., Benz, M., & Stutzer, A. (2004). Introducing procedural utility: Not only what, but also how matters. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 160(3), 377-401.
34. Furubotn, E. G., & Richter, R. (1997). Institutions and economic theory: The contribution of the new institutional economics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
35. Gerber, E. R., & Hug, S. (2001). Legislative response to direct legislation. In M. Mendelsohn & A. Parkin (Eds.). Referendum democracy, citizens, elites and deliberation in referendum campaigns (pp. 88-108). New York: Palgrave.
36. Hansen, M. H. (1991). The Athenian democracy in the age of demosthenes: Structure, principles and ideology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
37. Held, D. (1997). Democracy and the global order: From the modem state to cosmopolitan governance. Cambridge: Polity Press.
38. Hewson, M., & Sinclair, T. (Eds.). (1999). Approaches to global governance theory, Albany: State University of New York Press.
39. Intriligator, M. D. (1973). A probabilistic model of social choice. Review of Economic studies, 40(4), 553-560.
40. Kahler, M., & Lake, D. A. (Eds.). (2003). Governance in a global economy: Political authority in transition. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
41. Kaldor, M. (2003). Global civil society: An answer to war. Cambridge: Polity Press.
42. Kaul, I., Conceicao, P., Le Goulven, K., & Mendoza, R. U. (Eds.). (2003). Providing global public goods. Managing globalization. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
43. Keane, J. (2003). Global civil society? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
44. Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2000). Governance in a globalized world. Washington D.C.: Brookings.
45. Kirchgaessner, G., Feld, L., & Savioz, M. R. (1999). Die direkte Demokratie: Modern, erfolgreich, entwicklungs- und exportfähig. Basel et al.: Helbing and Lichtenhahn/Vahlen/Beck.
46. Knag, S. (1998). Let's toss for it: A surprising curb on political greed. Independent Review, 3(2), 199-209.
47. Magleby, D. B. (1984). Direct Legislation. Voting on ballot propositions in the United States. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University.
48. Manin, B. (1997). The principles of representative government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
49. Mansbridge, J. (1983). Beyond adversary democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
50. Matsusaka, J. G. (2004). For the many or the few: The initiative, public policy, and american democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
51. McKelvey, R. D. (1976). Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control. Journal of Economic Theory, 12, 472-482.
52. Mueller, D. C. (1978). Voting by veto. Journal of Public Economics, 10(1), 57-75.
53. Mueller, D. C. (1996). Constitutional democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.
54. Mueller, D. C. (Ed.). (1997). Perspectives on public choice: A handbook. Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
55. Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
56. Mueller, D. C., Tollison, R. D., & Willett, T. D. (1972). Representative democracy via random selection. Public Choice, 12, 57-68.
57. North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
58. Nye Jr., J. S., & Donahue, J. D. (2001). Governance in a globalizing world. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
59. Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and democratic theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
60. Pommerehne, W. W., & Weck-Hannemann, H. (1996). Tax rates, tax administration and income tax evasion. Public Choice, 88, 161-170.
61. Romer, T., & Rosenthal, H. (1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo. Public Choice, 33(4), 27-43.
62. Sally, D. (1995). Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas-a metaanalysis of experiments from 1958 to 1992. Rationality and Society, 7(1), 58-92.
63. Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. New York: Anchor Books.
64. Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. New York: Norton.
65. Thompson, D. F. (1970). The democratic citizen: Social science and democratic theory in the twentieth century. New York: Cambridge University Press.
66. Torgler, B. (2003). Direct democracy matters: Tax morale and political participation. In National tax association papers and proceedings, Orlando, 2002. Washington: National Tax Association.
67. Union of International Associations (Ed.). (2004). Yearbook of international organizations: Guide to global and civil society networks. Volume 1: Organization descriptions and cross-references. München: Saur.
68. Vaubel, R., & Willett, T. D. (Eds.). (1991). The political economy of international organizations: A public choice approach. Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press.
69. Vaubel, R., Dreher, A., & Soylu, U. (2003). Staff growth in international organizations: A principalagent problem? An empirical analysis. In J.-r. Chen and D. Sapsford (Eds.), Principles of international institutions-theoretical foundations and empirical evidence. Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.
70. Verweij, M., & Josling, T. E. (2003). Special issue: Deliberately democratizing multilateral organization. Governance: An international journal of policy, administration, and institutions, 76(1), 1-21.
71. Wortman, C. B., & Rabinowitz, V. C. (1979). Random assignment: The fairest of them all. Evaluation Studies Review Annual, 4, 177-184.