Setting lower bounds on truthfulness

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn 07-09-January-2007, Issue , 2007, Pages 1143-1152

  Mu'alem, Ahuva ^a   Schapira, Michael ^b  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS;

ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN; COMPUTATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS; INTERDOMAIN ROUTING; MINIMIZATION PROBLEMS; RANDOMIZED MECHANISM; SCHEDULING PROBLEM; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS; UNRELATED MACHINES;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 84969262412     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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