Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 286-293

  Saks, Michael ^a   Yu, Lan ^b  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Dominant strategy; Mechanism design; Strategyproof; Truthful; Weak monotonicity

Indexed keywords

DOMINANT STRATEGY; TRUTHFUL; WEAK MONOTONICITY;

CONSTRAINT THEORY; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 30044433982     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1064009.1064040     Document Type: Conference Paper

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