When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 139, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 47-74

  Li, Ming ^a   Madarász, Kristóf ^b  

^a Gina Cody School of Engineering and Computer Science   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Conflicts of interest; Disclosure

Indexed keywords

EID: 38849185911     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.009     Document Type: Article

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