Continuity in mechanism design without transfers

Economics Letters

Volumn 93, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 182-189

  Martimort, David ^a,b   Semenov, Aggey ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE FRANCE   (France)

Author keywords

Communication; Mechanism design without transfers

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750501837     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.04.011     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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