Relational delegation

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 1070-1089

  Alonso, Ricardo ^a   Matouschek, Niko ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 41749110051     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00126.x     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. ALONSO, R. AND MATOUSCHEK, N. "Optimal Delegation." Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 75 (2008), pp. 259-293.
2. ARMSTRONG, M. "Delegating Decision Making to an Agent with Unknown Preferences." Mimeo, University College London, 1995.
3. BAKER, G., GIBBONS, R., AND MURPHY, K. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109 (1994), pp. 1125-1156.
4. _,_, AND _. "Informal Authority in Organizations." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 15 (1999), pp. 56-73.
5. _,_, AND _. "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 117 (2002), pp. 39-84.
6. BOWER, J. Managing the Resource Allocation Process: A Study of Corporate Planning and Investment. Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1970.
7. CRAWFORD, V. AND SOBEL, J. "Strategic Information Transmission." Econometrica, Vol. 50 (1982), pp. 1431- 1452.
8. DESSEIN, W. "Authority and Communication in Organizations." Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69 (2002), pp. 811-838.
9. GIBBONS, R. A Primer in Game Theory. New York: Prentice Hall, 1992.
10. HARRIS, M. AND RAVIV, A. "The Capital Budgeting Process, Incentives and Information." Journal of Finance, Vol. 51 (1996), pp. 1139-1174.
11. HOLMSTRÖM, B. On Incentives and Control in Organizations. Ph.D. Dissertation, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 1977.
12. _. "On the Theory of Delegation." In M. Boyer and R. Kihlstrom, eds., Bayesian Models in Economic Theory. New York: North-Holland, 1984.
13. JENSEN, M. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers." American Economic Review, Vol. 76 (1986), pp. 323-329.
14. _. and MECKLING, W. "Specific and General Knowledge and Organizational Structure." In L. Werin AND H. Wijkander, eds., Contract Economics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
15. KRISHNA, V. AND MORGAN, J. "Contracting for Information under Imperfect Commitment." Mimeo, Pennsylvania State University and University of California, Berkeley, 2006.
16. LEVIN, J. "Relational Incentive Contracts." American Economic Review, Vol. 93 (2003), pp. 835-847.
17. MACLEOD, B. "Subjective Performance Evaluation." American Economic Review, Vol. 93 (2003), pp. 216-240.
18. MARINO, A. AND MATSUSAKA, J. "Decision Processes, Agency Problems, and Information: An Economic Analysis of Capital Budgeting Procedures." Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 18 (2005), pp. 301-325.
19. MARSHUETZ, R. "How American Can Allocates Capital." Harvard Business Review, Vol. 63 (1985), pp. 82-91.
20. MARTIMORT, D. AND SEMENOV, A. "Continuity in Mechanism Design without Transfers." Economics Letters, Vol. 93 (2006), pp. 182-189.
21. MELUMAD, N. AND SHIBANO, T. "Communication in Settings with No Transfers." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 22 (1991), pp. 173-198.
22. MILGROM, P. AND ROBERTS, J. Economics, Organization & Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992.
23. OTTAVIANI, M. "Economics of Advice." Mimeo, University College London, 2000.
24. ROSS, M. "Capital Budgeting Practices of Twelve Large Manufacturers." Financial Management, Vol. 15 (1986), pp. 15-22.
25. TAGGART, R. "Allocating Capital among a Firm's Divisions: Hurdle Rages vs. Budgets." Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 10 (1987), pp. 177-190.