Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal-agent models

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 128, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 306-314

  Strausz, Roland ^a  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Bunching; Deterministic mechanisms; Mechanism design; Principal agent theory; Randomization

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646377627     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.008     Document Type: Article

References (6)

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