Message-contingent delegation

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 60, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 490-506

  Krähmer, Daniel ^a  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Delegation; Imperfect commitment; Mechanism design; Transferable utility

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746276227     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.01.005     Document Type: Article

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