Chapter 4 Litigation

Handbook of Law and Economics

Volumn 1, Issue , 2007, Pages 259-342

  Spier, Kathryn E ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

bargaining; courts; litigation; settlement; trials

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649313533     PISSN: 15740730     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0730(07)01004-3     Document Type: Review

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