Exploiting future settlements: A signalling model of most-favored-nation clauses in settlement bargaining

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 467-485

  Daughety, Andrew F ^a   Reinganum, Jennifer F ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 8644244831     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1593703     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. AGHION, P. AND BOLTON, P. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry." American Economic Review, Vol. 77 (1987), pp. 388-401.
2. BULOW, J.I. "Durable-Goods Monopolists." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90 (1982), pp. 314-332.
3. BUTZ, D.A. "Durable-Good Monopoly and Best-Price Provisions." American Economic Review, Vol. 80 (1990), pp. 1062-1076.
4. CHO, I.-K. AND KREPS, D.M. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 102 (1987), pp. 179-221.
5. COASE, R.H. "Durability and Monopoly." Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 15 (1972), pp. 143-149.
6. COOPER, T.E. AND FRIES, T.L. "The Most-Favored-Nation Pricing Policy and Negotiated Prices." International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 9 (1991), pp. 209-223.
7. COOTER, R. AND ULEN, T. Law and Economics, 3d ed. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 2000.
8. DAUGHETY, A.F. AND REINGANUM, J.F. "Asymmetric Information Acquisition and Behavior in Role Choice Models: An Endogenously Generated Signaling Game." International Economic Review, Vol. 35 (1994), pp. 795-819.
9. - AND -. "Hush Money." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 30 (1999), pp. 661-678.
10. - AND -. "Informational Externalities in Settlement Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 33 (2002), pp. 587-604.
11. LAFRANCE, A.B. "Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and Public Policy." American Journal of Law and Medicine, Vol. 26 (2000), pp. 187-203.
12. MARX, L.M. AND SHAFFER, G. "Opportunism and Nondiscrimination Clauses." Working Paper, University of Rochester, 2001.
13. MCAFEE, R.P. AND SCHWARTZ, M. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity." American Economic Review, Vol. 84 (1994), pp. 210-230.
14. NEILSON, W.S. AND WINTER, H. "Enhanced Bargaining Power with Most-Favored-Customer Pricing." Economics Letters, Vol. 44 (1994), pp. 61-66.
15. REA, S.A., JR. "Penalty Doctrine in Contract Law." In P. Newman, ed., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. New York: Stockton Press, 1998.
16. REINGANUM, J.F. AND WILDE, L.L. "Settlement, Litigation and the Allocation of Litigation Costs." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 17 (1986), pp. 557-566.
17. SAGE, M.J., AND BENNETT, M. "Most-Favored-Nations Clauses: Do They Help Reach Agreements or Just Create Problems?" The Bankruptcy Strategist, Vol. 19 (2001), pp. 1-6.
18. SCHLOSSER, J. "The D.C. Circuit Review August 1999-July 2000." George Washington Law Review, Vol. 69 (2001), pp. 511-520.
19. SPIER, K.E. "The Use of 'Most-Favored-Nation' Clauses in Settlement of Litigation." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34 (2003a), pp. 78-95.
20. -. "Tied to the Mast: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts." Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 32 (2003b), pp. 91-120.
21. VISCUSI, W.K. Smoke-Filled Rooms: A Postmortem on the Tobacco Deal. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.