Bargaining without a common prior - An immediate agreement theorem

Econometrica

Volumn 71, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 793-811

  Yildiz, Muhamet ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Common prior assumption; Delay; Misperception; Optimism

Indexed keywords

BOUNDARY CONDITIONS; GAME THEORY; MARKETING; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; THEOREM PROVING;

AGREEMENT THEOREM; BARGAINING; MISPERCEPTION; OPTIMISM;

ECONOMICS;

EID: 0038805387     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00426     Document Type: Article

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