"Tied to the mast": Most-favored-nation clauses in settlement contracts

Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 32, Issue 1 I, 2003, Pages 91-120

  Spier, Kathryn E ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042671113     PISSN: 00472530     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/345678     Document Type: Review

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