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Volumn 18, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 187-200

Capital structure, priority rules, and the settlement of civil claims

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EID: 0013115531     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(98)00005-2     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (18)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.