The use of "most-favored-nation" clauses in settlement of litigation

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 78-95

  Spier, Kathryn E ^a  

^a National Bereau of Economics Research   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037362113     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3087444     Document Type: Article

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