Accuracy versus falsification costs: The optimal amount of evidence under different procedures

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 134-156

  Emons, Winand ^a   Fluet, Claude ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 64749092123     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewm046     Document Type: Article

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