Trial procedures and optimal limits on proof-taking

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 309-327

  Palumbo, Giuliana ^a  

^a EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042907597     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(01)00059-X     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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3. Grossman, S. J. & H. Hart (1983). An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica 51 (1), 7-45.
4. Laffont, J. J. & J. Tirole (1991). The politics of government decision making: a theory of regulatory capture. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 1089-1127.
5. McChesney F.S. On the procedural superiority of a civil law system a comment . Kyklos. 3:1977;507-510.
6. Ordover J. A. & Weitzman P. (1977). On the efficient organization of trials: a comment. Kyklos, 3, 511-516.
7. Palumbo, G. (2000). Optimal duplication of effort in adversarial systems, mimeo.
8. Pizzi, W. T. & Marafioti L. (1992). The new italian code of criminal procedure: the difficulties of building an adversarial trial system on a civil law foundation. The Yale Journal of International Law, 17 (1), 1-40.
9. Shin H.S. Adversarial and inquisitorial procedures in arbitration. RAND Journal of Economics. 29:(2):1998;378-405.
10. Tullock G. On the efficient organization of trials. Kyklos. 28:(4):1975;745-762.