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Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2003, Pages
Signal jamming in games with multiple senders
Author keywords

Multiple senders; Signal jamming; Signaling games
Indexed keywords

EID: 14944349261     PISSN: 15345971     EISSN: 15345971     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1080     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (5)
References (15)
  • 1
    • 0001408305 scopus 로고
    • Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
    • Austen-Smith, D. (1993). Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule, Games and Economic Behavior 5: 3-43
    • (1993) Games and Economic Behavior , vol.5 , pp. 3-43
    • Austen-Smith, D.1
  • 3
    • 0000037696 scopus 로고
    • Equilibrium selection in signalling games
    • Banks, J. and J. Sobel (1987). Equilibrium Selection in Signalling Games, Econometrica 55: 647-662
    • (1987) Econometrica , vol.55 , pp. 647-662
    • Banks, J.1    Sobel, J.2
  • 5
    • 0001139863 scopus 로고
    • Signalling games and stable equilibria
    • Cho, I. and D. Kreps (1987). Signalling Games and Stable Equilibria, Quarterly Journal of Economics 102: 179-221
    • (1987) Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol.102 , pp. 179-221
    • Cho, I.1    Kreps, D.2
  • 7
    • 0000292804 scopus 로고
    • On the strategic stability of equilibria
    • Kohlberg, E. and J.-F. Mertens (1986). On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria, Econometrica 54: 1003-1038
    • (1986) Econometrica , vol.54 , pp. 1003-1038
    • Kohlberg, E.1    Mertens, J.-F.2
  • 9
    • 0035533821 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Asymmetric information and legislative rules: Some amendments
    • Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001b). Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, American Political Science Review 95: 435-52
    • (2001) American Political Science Review , vol.95 , pp. 435-452
    • Krishna, V.1    Morgan, J.2
  • 10
    • 0040600426 scopus 로고
    • Learning in equilibrium models of arbitration
    • Gibbons, R. (1989). Learning in Equilibrium Models of Arbitration, American Economic Review 78: 896-912
    • (1989) American Economic Review , vol.78 , pp. 896-912
    • Gibbons, R.1
  • 11
    • 84935509181 scopus 로고
    • Asymmetric information and legislative rules with a heterogeneous committee
    • Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1989). Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee, American Journal of Political Science 33: 459-490
    • (1989) American Journal of Political Science , vol.33 , pp. 459-490
    • Gilligan, T.1    Krehbiel, K.2
  • 13
    • 13444284461 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Entry deterrence and entry inducement in an industry with complementary products
    • forthcoming
    • Kim, J.-Y. (2003). Entry Deterrence and Entry Inducement in an Industry with Complementary Products, forthcoming in International Economic Journal
    • (2003) International Economic Journal
    • Kim, J.-Y.1
  • 15

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.